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AIR DISASTER LITIGATION WITHOUT DIVERSITY
JAMES JOHN DOUGLAS*
T HE RECENT introduction of H.R. 2202 once again! brings
into question the need for diversity jurisdiction in federal
courts. Many trial attorneys complain that H.R. 2202's abolish-
ment of diversity jurisdiction virtually eliminates federal jurisdiction
in areas where it is desirable, such as in air disaster cases! Other
* B.S., State University of New York at Albany, 1974; J.D., Southern Method-
ist University, 1979; Member of State Bar of Texas.
IH.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 2202,
"A Bill to abolish diversity of citizenship as a basis of jurisdiction of Federal
district courts, to abolish the amount in controversy requirement in Federal
question cases, and for other purposes." 125 CoNG. REC. H692 (daily ed. Feb.
15, 1979).
1In 1978 an identical bill, H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), passed
the House by a vote of 266 to 133. 124 CONG. REc. H1,570 (1978). A similar
bill, S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), encountered substantial opposition
from organized bar groups. MacKenzie, Diversity at the Crossroads, The Na-
tional Law Journal, Oct. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1. See note 4 infra.
I Diversity jurisdiction, the first granted to federal courts, was originally
conferred in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)). See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
4The opposition comes from various organized bar groups, in particular,
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), whose membership of
34,000 are counsel for plaintiffs. See MacKenzie, Diversity at the Crossroads,
supra note 2; Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform; Hearings
on H.R. 761, H.R. 5546, H.R. 7493, H.R. 9123, H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68-77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings] (testimony of Robert G. Begam); id. at 230-46 (testimony of John P.
Frank).
'This concern is evidenced by the following statistics: In the year between
July 1, 1976 and June 30, 1977, 605 diversity cases involving airplane personal
injury were filed in United States district courts. Hearings, supra note 4, at 361
[Appendix III-Statistics, furnished by Administrative Office of the United States
Courts]. In 1976, the most recent year for which complete statistics are available,
there were thirty aircraft accidents involving domestic and international scheduled
air carriers, which resulted in seventy-seven fatalities. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: Table
No. 1134, at 671 (99th ed. 1978). Note that these figures do not include the
statistics from the Tenerife disaster, March 27, 1977, in which two Boeing 747's
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observers believe that the retention of diversity jurisdiction merely
maintains an unwieldy system for the resolution of such contro-
versies.' One solution to both of these concerns may be found in
a bill creating a federal cause of action in air disaster cases. This
article will discuss the following points: (1) the arguments for
and against diversity jurisdiction; (2) the problems caused by
the lack of uniformity in state laws applied in air tort litigation
and the creation of a federal cause of action as a solution to these
problems; and (3) the alternative jurisdictional bases for federal
litigation of air disaster cases.
I. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: PROS AND CONS
A. The Advantages of Federal Courts
The American trial bar has vigorously opposed" H.R. 2202,8
which, with one exception,' abolishes the jurisdiction of federal
courts based on diversity of citizenship" for suits exclusively be-
collided, claiming over five hundred lives. Collision Course, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
11, 1977, at 48; . . . What's he doing, He'll kill us all, TIME, Apr. 11, 1977, at 22.
' See, e.g., Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congres-
sional Solution, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 299, 299-306 (1969); Note, The Applicability
of Federal Common Law to Aviation Tort Litigation, 63 GEo. L. REv. 1083
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Aviation Tort Litigation]; Comment, The Case for
a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster Litigation: A Judicial Solution to a
National Problem, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 232-38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Judicial Solution]; Comment, Air Crash Litigation: Disaster in the Courts, 7 Sw.
U. L. REv. 661, 661-75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Disaster in the Courts](forward by Judge Peirson M. Hall, Senior Judge, United States District Court,
Central District of California).
7 See notes 2 and 4 supra.
' H.R. 2202, supra note I, revitalizes a campaign to abolish diversity juris-
diction which nearly succeeded in 1978. See notes 2 and 4 supra. Much of the
authority referred to herein therefore consists of legislative materials published
in connection with the earlier proceedings.
I Interpleader jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976) would be retained.
See generally H.R. 2202, supra note 1.
1028 U.S.C. 5 1332(a) (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects
of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
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tween citizens of different states." Trial lawyers argue that they
need to retain this option of availing themselves of federal courts
because those courts offer the following advantages: (1) impartial
forums for out-of-state litigants;" (2) more competent judges;18
(3) superior procedural rules;" and (4) forums which may have
less crowded dockets than state courts.'5
Foremost among these advantages is the availability of impartial
forums for out-of-state litigants, especially in areas where regional
prejudice exists. According to traditional theory, fear of local bias
is the primary reason for diversity jurisdiction." Leading com-
mentators, however, have found other historical roots. Judge Henry
J. Friendly," for instance, has suggested that while the local bias
theory gained rapid acceptance after the Constitutional Conven-
tion in 1787, it was not the dominant force behind the incorpora-
tion of diversity jurisdiction into article III of the Constitution."'
Rather, it was a desire to provide an alternative forum, particularly
to encourage commercial expansion into states where the workings
of the local court systems tended to discourage investment by
otherwise eager entrepreneurs. "[Tihe method of appointment and
the tenure of the judges," Judge Friendly has stated, "were not of
"The anti-diversity proposal strikes out paragraph (1) of § 1332(a), but re-
tains paragraphs (2) through (4), which pertain to alienage jurisdiction. H.R.
2202, supra note 1, at S l(b). See note 10 supra. The "amount in controversy"
requirement is increased from $10,000 to $25,000 for these cases. H.R. 2202,
supra note 1, at S l(a). It is eliminated completely, however, for section 1331
"Federal Question" cases. Id. § 2(b). The bill also modifies the venue provisions
in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976) by permitting suit where all plaintiffs reside, in addi-
tion to where all defendants reside and "in any judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated" in
non-diversity cases. H.R. 2202, S 3(a). Non-diversity cases are currently limited,
except where provided elsewhere, to the judicial district where all defendants
reside, or where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
12 See text accompanying notes 16-26 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 27-38 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 39-46 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
1"Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)
(opinion of Chief Justice Marshall). See also H.R. REP. No. 893, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3, 4 (1978).
17 Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
18 Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv.
482, 492-97 (1928).
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the sort to invite confidence."19
Whatever its true historical justification, the local bias theory has
been generally accepted and is now the leading argument for the
retention of diversity jurisdiction."0 Some individuals within the
anti-diversity group question the extent to which this bias exists
today."1 There is significant support," nevertheless, even within
this anti-diversity group,' for the proposition that local bias does
exist today and is serious enough to warrant attention.24
The fundamental issue beyond the existence of local bias, how-
ever, is the extent to which federal courts actually do offer greater
impartiality than state courts. One argument is that since juries
in both state and federal courts are drawn from the same geo-
19 Id. at 497-98. Examples of the abuses sought to be avoided were found
in Connecticut, where members of the council which appointed judges also sat on
the Supreme Court of Errors. The same council members often appeared as
advocates before the judges they appointed, thereafter reviewing cases in which
they were professionally interested. Sometimes they even argued before their
fellow appellate justices. Id. at 498. See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 85 (3d ed. 1976).
' See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIC-
TION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 107-08 (1969); Frank, For Maintain-
ing Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 1 (1963); Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 329-30 (1977).
11 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 220 (testimony of Charles Alan Wright);
H.R. REP. No. 893, supra note 16, at 3, 4 (1978).
'See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 330:
[S]ectional prejudice is by no means a thing of the past, and as a
New Englander, I would add that prejudice even against those from
neighboring states is not unheard of. The vestiges of provincialism
may still remain, especially outside urban areas, and juries drawn
from small venires are more likely to be affected than those selected
from wider areas. Moreover, with respect to corporations, is it
really so clear that a truly local business, with all the influence
it may have in the community, has no advantage against an out-
of-state individual or corporate adversary?
See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 239 (testimony of John P. Frank).
' See H.R. REP. No. 893, supra note 16, at 4.
24 The antidiversity group argues, however, that a better alternative would
be "to commit time and resources to improving the quality of the state courts,"
rather than to partially combat the problem in federal court in those fortuitous
cases where the parties are of diverse citizenship. Id. See also McGowan, Federal
Jurisdiction: Legislative and Judicial Change, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 517, 533
(1978):
But if the justification for diversity jurisdiction comes down to the
proposition that federal courts provide 'better justice' than do state
courts, then we must ponder why this better justice should be
granted on the fortuitous basis of diverse citizenship, when it is
denied in suits between parties residing in the same state.
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graphic area, litigation in federal courts is not an effective shield
against local bias. The response to that argument is that the
neutralizing element is not the jury, but the federal judge."
Lifetime tenure and immunity from reductions in compensa-
tion" result in federal judges who, according to one commentator,
"are as insulated from majoritarian pressures as is functionally
possible, precisely to insure their ability to enforce the Constitu-
tion without fear of reprisal."2' In contrast, state judges are nor-
mally selected for fixed terms by appointments, elections or initial
appointments, followed by retention elections. Each of these
methods for the selection and retention of state judges is more
political in nature2' than the one employed in federal courts and
makes a state judge more vulnerable to political pressures than
his federal counterpart.2'
The independence of the judge, of course, can play a significant
part in the outcome of any trial. 1 In a recent article, Professor
Shapiro discussed how litigation can be influenced by a judge's
independence:
Many cases are settled with the participation of the judge or
disposed of on questions of law before, during, or after trial,
others are profoundly affected by virtually unreviewable discretion-
2 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H1,560 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Sawyer). See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 329.
2'See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 -ARv. L. Rv. 1105, 1127-28 (1977).
27 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Federal judges may, however, be removed by
impeachment for improper conduct. Id. Note that while this may lead to more
independent judges, it may adversely affect the quality of the federal judiciary,
as in cases where judges remain active long after they should have retired. See
note 34 infra.
28Neuborne, supra note 26, at 1127. The author also refers to "a series of
psychological and attitudinal characteristics . . . instilling elan and a sense of
mission in federal judges and exerting . . . a palpable influence on the quality
of judicial conduct." Id. at 1124.
"Neuborne, supra note 26, at 1127 n.81. The contrast was colorfully articu-
lated during the House debate on H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), where
Rep. Hyde stated, "The difference between a federal judge and a state judge is
profound. A federal judge is on Mount Olympus; he is appointed for life. A
state judge is elected, and he is in the political swamps and gets those phone
calls from political people. So, there is a vast difference in the atmosphere of
the two courts." 124 CONG. REC. H1,560 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978).
"
0Trial judges are appointed with lifetime tenure in only four states-
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and New Jersey. Neuborne, supra
note 26, at 1127 n.81.
" Shapiro, supra note 20, at 330.
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ary rulings or by the manner in which the judge conducts the trial;
still others are tried by the judge without a jury or involve equit-
able remedies in addition to legal relief. In all these cases the
judge's own bias or lack of bias can determine whether an out of
state party is prejudiced.'
The foregoing analysis suggests a second advantage of the fed-
eral courts: federal judges are generally considered to be more
competente than their state counterparts.' This disparity exists
because the selection process for the federal judiciary, while politi-
cal in nature, is far more concerned with professional competence
than the methods of selection of the states.' Several additional
elements contribute to the higher quality of the federal judiciary.
First, there are fewer federal judges, so it is easier to maintain a
higher level of quality.TM Second, since much of the legal research
conducted in a given case is performed by judicial clerks rather than
by the judge himself, the considerable disparity in the caliber of
the clerks results in the dispensation of a different caliber of jus-
tice."' Third, federal judges are better paid than the state judges."8
Federal courts are also advantageous because of their superior
procedural rules. For cases involving numerous parties domiciled
in many different jurisdictions, there is little question that, through
federal procedural devices, litigation is much more convenient in
federal court than in many state courts. Among the procedural
advantages under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the
"100 mile bulge" for service of process, 9 subpoenas for out-of-
2I1d.
I See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 330; Neuborne, supra note 26, at 1121-22.
" See, e.g., Wright, The Federal Court and the Nature and Quality of State
Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317, 327 (1967); Neuborne, supra note 26, at 1121;
McGowan, supra note 24, at 533. Of course, there are exceptions. As John
Frank notes, "nor are all federal judges wiser or abler or all federal pro-
cedures more satisfactory than state procedures. The federal bench has its share
of incompetents, tyrants and fools .... Frank, supra note 20, at 10.
3 Neuborne, supra note 26, at 1122.
3 Id. at 1121.
111d. at 1122. According to Professor Neuborne, federal clerks are selected
from the most recent top law school graduates, while state trial clerks "are
either career bureaucrats or patronage employees [who] may lack both the
ability and dedication of their federal counterparts." Id.
I Id. at 1121. In 1977, for example, federal judges earned $54,500 per year
for life, while the average state trial judge was paid $33,823 per year. Id. at 1121
n.61, citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES
IN THE STATE COURT SYSTEM 4 (1976).
39See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
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state parties 0 and the availability of pretrial discovery in out-of-
state districts.'
Although many states have patterned their rules after the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, the utility of these rules in federal
courts is enhanced by a variety of statutory procedural devices
not found in the states.' Among these devices is the Multidistrict
Litigation Statute," under which actions may be transferred to
any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Another device permits the transfer of a case to a more convenient
forum." Still another statute, the federal interpleader statute;'
permits nationwide service of process. In addition, federal courts
offer litigants the opportunity to register a judgment in any other
district.'
Finally, in areas with heavy case backlogs in both the state
and federal courts, trial lawyers currently enjoy the option of
filing cases over which both the state and federal courts have con-
current jurisdiction in the court with the smallest backlog."' It is
believed by many trial lawyers that elimination of this option
would result in a much larger backlog in the state courts.' While
40See FED. R. CIv. P. 45(e)(1).
41 See FEID. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
'See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 328; 124 CONG. REC. H1,560 (daily ed. Feb.
28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Sebelius) (referring to the inadequacy of state
procedures for reaching across state lines to influence procedures in the in-
creasingly complex litigation regarding interstate operations). Note, however,
that most states have enacted liberal long arm statutes, which facilitates in per-
sonam jurisdiction over carriers or manufacturers, assuming the required minimum
contacts are present. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
"28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
"28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976).
4628 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
'
7 This option is commonly referred to as forum shopping. One motivation
is the size of the potential verdict. Since $10,000 is the threshold amount for a
case to be brought in federal court, the sights of the jury are lifted to a
potentially larger verdict. 124 CONG. REC. H1,560 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978)
(remarks of Rep. Sawyer).
sSee Hearings, supra note 4, at 237-38:
[Wihat happens is that diversity clusters, of course, where the most
people are and therefore the Federal districts that are the most
crowded with diversity are in the areas where the State courts are
also most crowded. The practical consequence is . . . that you are
simply going to move the manure from one pile to another. ...
19801
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it is argued that the deficiencies of a court system in a given state
are a problem for that state to solve, and not a federal problem,9
it is also a problem over which the out-of-state litigant has no
control. As one leading commentator suggests, the out-of-state
litigant should not be saddled with the shortcomings of a state's
court system "if the Constitution authorizes an alternative."
B. Arguments for Abolition
The main objectives of the proposed anti-diversity legislation
are to reduce the congestion which currently exists in federal
courts' and to eliminate "its insidious effects on litigants."' There
are, however, more fundamental reasons for this bill, including the
notion that cases founded on diversity jurisdiction are poorly
suited for trial in federal court." Also, principles of federalism
and a sensitivity to the proper jurisdictional balance between
state and federal courts!" dictate that the federal courts should not
(testimony of John P. Frank). Examples of the delays in question are in Chicago,
where the wait on the federal side is 11 months, compared with 37 months on the
state side; Brooklyn, where it is 18 months on the federal side, compared with
35 on the state side; Philadelphia, where the figures are 27 versus 47; and
Boston, where they are 42 months as opposed to 34 in the federal courts. See 124
CONG. REC. H1,559 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Gephardt); Hear-
ings, supra note 4, at 238. Contra H.R. REP. No. 893, supra note 16, which states
that, "the diverting of diversity cases from the federal courts to the State courts
will not impose too great a burden on the latter. Essentially, 32,000 cases pending
before 400 federal district judges will cause few problems when allocated among
6,000 State judges of general jurisdiction." Id. at 3.
1 "The remedy is to improve the administration of justice in the Duval
Counties around the country-as Texas has since done in Duval County itself-
rather than to provide an unbiased forum for those who happen to be from
out of state while denying it to those from in the states." Hearings, supra note 4,
at 220 (statement of Charles Alan Wright).
50 Shapiro, supra note 20, at 329.
61 See text accompanying notes 57-66 infra.
"2 H.R. REP. No. 893, supra note 16, at 2.
Second, the Federal courts must be freed from the shackles of
congestion to do the job they do best-that of adjudicating dis-
putes in traditional Federal subject-matter areas such as copyrights,
patents, trademarks, commerce, bankruptcy, antitrust and admiralty;
rendering speedy criminal justice for those accused of crimes; pro-
tecting the basic civil and constitutional liberties of all citizens; and
resolving vital and often recently identified rights ....
Id. at 4, 5.
See text accompanying notes 67-73 infra.
"Hearings, supra note 4, at 147 (testimony of Judge Gignoux, quoting
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Warren): "It is essential that we achieve a
proper jurisdictional balance between the Federal and State court systems, assigning
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interfere' in matters which are "exclusively within state authority."'
For years congestion in federal courts and, in particular, the
volume of cases founded on diversity jurisdiction, has been a
subject of concern among both judges and legislators. As early
as 1954, Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Lumber-
men's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert," noted with alarm the in-
creases in federal cases based on diversity and stated that the con-
tinuance of diversity jurisdiction would necessitate an increase in
the number of district judges. "This in turn," he said, "will result,
by its own Gresham's law, in a depreciation of the judicial currency
and the consequent impairment of the prestige and of the efficacy
of the federal courts."" The statistics for recent years reveal that
the alarm voiced by Justice Frankfurter in Lumbermen's was
justified. Between 1963 and 1977 the number of civil cases com-
menced in federal district courts jumped from 63,630 to 130,567,"0
an increase of 105%." Between 1974, when there were 103,530
civil cases filed," and 1977, the case load increased by 26.1%.
The District and Circuit Judges-Appointment Act of 1978,"
passed in response to this court congestion, authorizes the appoint-
ment of an additional 111 federal district judges, an increase of
28%." If this rate of increase in case filings continues, however,
to each system those cases most appropriate in the light of the basic principles
of federalism."
2 See text accompanying notes 74-81 infra.
56 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
57348 U.S. 48 (1954).
51 Id. at 59.
59 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 198 (1963). This total includes 19,990 diversity cases.
Id.
6 0 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 317 (1977). This total includes 31,678 diversity
cases. Id.
1 The total of 130,567 civil cases reflects a 66.8% increase in diversity filings
between 1963 and 1977. See notes 59, 60 supra.
61ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 383 (1974).
'Pub. L. No. 95-486, 5 1, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978).
"Interestingly, the 28% increase in the number of federal judges roughly
corresponds to the rate of increase in civil case filings between 1974 and 1977,
which was 26.1%. Hence the number of civil case filings would catch up with
the number of new judicial appointments in approximately three years.
1980]
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the pre-Act level of congestion should reappear in approximately
three years,' requiring the appointment of still more federal judges.
One obvious method to lessen federal court congestion, therefore,
would be to abolish diversity jurisdiction, which currently com-
prises approximately 25% of all cases filed in federal courts."
Cases brought under diversity jurisdiction are also ill-suited
for litigation in federal courts because of the time and resources
which they require. Under the doctrine articulated by Justice
Brandeis in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,7 federal courts must apply
a state's substantive law in diversity actions." Erie" requires that
the outcome of litigation in federal court, to the extent to which
a state's legal rules are applied, should be the same as if the case
had been tried in a court of the state in which the federal court
sits." When legal precedent is inadequate, this requirement creates
See note 64 supra.
e'In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1977, 31,678 diversity cases were filed
in federal court, comprising 24.26% of the 130,567 civil cases filed. See note
61 supra.
(1304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6828 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) states: "The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Under
Erie a federal judge is bound to apply the substantive, but not the procedural,
rules of the forum state. Quite often the line between "substance" and "procedure"
becomes quite fine. A widely accepted definition of "substance" can be found in
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan):
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether
to apply a state or a federal rule, whether 'substantive' or 'pro-
cedural,' is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the
choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions
respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves
to state regulation. . . . (Citations omitted)
Id. at 475.
6See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (whether service of
process should be effected as provided by federal or state rules); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (whether state rule requir-
ing security deposit by plaintiff for defendant's expenses, including legal fees, in
stockholder's derivative suit was "procedural" or "substantive" rule); Ragan v.
Merchant's Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (whether federal
or state statute of limitations applies); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945) (whether federal or state statute of limitations applies).
70Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1.945): "But since a federal
court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the
state .. "
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a particularly difficult situation for a federal judge, and excessive
amounts of judicial resources" must be expended to predict the
result which a state court would reach."
The fact that federal judges are permitted to interpret state law
also disturbs the constitutional balance in federal-state relations.
Not only does litigation of questions of state law in federal court
interfere with the precedential3 development of state law within
" See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Employers Assurance Corp., 445 F.2d 1278 (5th
Cir. 1971), where Judge Clarke artfully described the task which confronts a
federal judge in this situation:
In one of those extraordinary bits of diversity mysticism, we must
perform the occult multiple feats of divining whether the district
court correctly predicted what a Florida court would determine an
Illinois court would decide on a question which the courts of
Illinois have not yet squarely faced.
Id. An excellent example of the magnitude of this task is found in Merritt-
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 2, 319 F.2d 94, 103-04 (2d
Cir. 1963), where the court was required to determine whether under New York
law sovereign immunity permitted attaching a levy on New York funds of a
State of Washington public utility district. The court's "opinion contains 71
cites to New York decisions, many more to New York statutes and public
documents, 38 to cases from other jurisdictions, 23 to treatises or law review
articles; and . . . 'a vast body of decisional law.'" Wright, supra note 34, at
323-25. For additional cases which illustrate the task of a federal judge in a
diversity case see Marina Management Corp. v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 43, 45-46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 104 (1978); Samuelson v. Susen,
576 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1978); Holt v. Seversky Electronatom Corp., 452
F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1971); Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280
(1960), rev'd and remanded, 365 U.S. 293 (1961), on remand, 290 F.2d 904
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wainscott, 439 F. Supp. 840, 841-42 (D. Alaska 1977). See generally H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 142-43 (1973); Wright,
supra note 34, at 323-26; Hearings, supra note 4, at 205, where during the course
of a discussion of the difficulties presented by diversity cases, Judge Friendly
remarked sardonically: "You probably hear a great many complaints from
federal judges, but I doubt if you have ever heard one say that without diversity
he would find that his life did not have sufficient breadth."
" See King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S.
153 (1948), where the issue was the manner in which certain language in an
insurance contract would be construed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The federal district court had decided in favor of the beneficiary, but was
reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Subsequent to the federal district court
decision, two lower state courts reached conflicting conclusions when considering
the same issue. The United States Supreme Court withheld opinion on which
construction was proper, but specifically held that the Circuit Court of Appeals
did not have to follow the decision of the lower state courts. See also United
States Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 935 (1964), where the Fifth Circuit abstained in a diversity action,
in which state law on the point in question was particularly obscure.
" While a state court is not constitutionally bound by a federal court in-
terpretation of state law, the federal court's decision is likely to be given some
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the state court systems,74 but it also suggests that state courts dis-
pense an inferior quality of justice."9 The sponsors of the anti-
diversity legislation argue that perpetuation of diversity jurisdic-
tion only creates disharmony between the federal and state gov-
ernments and that there are few, if any, bases to believe that
state courts are inferior."' In addition, they suggest that if some
state courts are, in fact, biased toward the local litigants, the
problem is hardly remedied by providing an alternative forum for
a small percentage of the cases."
If, as has been stated at the hearings on the anti-diversity legis-
lation, 8 the original reasons for diversity jurisdiction no longer
exist," federal intrusion can no longer be justified into areas in
which the states have a greater interest. Although Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Elbert' was written long before the current congressional at-
tempt to abolish diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, it best sum-
marizes the argument put forth by the anti-diversity forces:
Can it fairly be said that state tribunals are not now established
on a sufficiently "good footing" to adjudicate state litigation that
arises between citizens of different States, including the artificial
corporate citizens, when they are the only resort for the much
larger volume of the same type of litigation between their own
citizens? Can the state tribunals not yet be trusted to mete out
justice to non-resident litigants; should resident litigants not be
compelled to trust their own state tribunals? In any event, is it
sound public policy to withdraw from the incentives and energies
for reforming state tribunals, where such reform is needed, the
consideration by the state courts in later cases. Some states have enacted statutes
which permit certification by the federal court of state cases to the highest state
court for decision. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1973). For a case in which this
certification procedure was employed see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S.
207 (1960); Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
4 H.R. REP. No. 893, supra note 16, at 4.
73See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. S31 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
Metzenbaum). See also text accompanying notes 24-38 supra.
"See H.R. REP. No. 893, supra note 16, at 2; 124 CONG. REc. S31, note
30 supra.
77 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. H1,558 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Wiggins); H.R. REP. No. 893, supra note 16, at 4.
" See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 208 (testimony of Judge Henry J.
Friendly); id. at 220 (testimony of Charles Alan Wright).
'1 Id.; but see Shapiro, supra note 20, at 330.
s0348 U.S. 48, 59-60 (1954).
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interests of influential groups who through diversity litigation are
now enabled to avoid state courts?"
II. CONFLICTS AND UNIFORMITY
By its very nature, air crash litigation involves parties of diverse
citizenship."2 Therefore, most actions stemming from major air
crashes which present complex substantive and procedural prob-
lems have traditionally been brought in federal court.' The main
cause of this complexity is that the rights being adjudicated are
state-created,' with little uniformity among the various state laws."
The enactment of a federal statute creating a federal cause of
action for air disaster cases would eliminate the problems result-
ing from conflicts among the state laws applied in these situations. "
A. Conflict of Laws
The ideal courtroom situation, for choice of law purposes, is
one in which all plaintiffs and defendants are domiciled in the
state in which the disaster occurs.' Assuming no federal statute
controls, there is little question of which state's substantive law
applies. Air crash litigation, however, typically involves a multi-
tude of parties, including different manufacturers, airlines, gov-
81Id.
8' Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976) a corporation is deemed a citizen of
any state in which it has been incorporated and of the state where it has its
principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). In Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (1 Cranch) 267 (1806), the Court established the rule that there
must be complete diversity between the parties to grant jurisdiction to federal
courts.
83See text accompanying notes 87-143 infra.
"Tydings, supra note 6, at 311.
1 E.g., the Texas wrongful death statute is TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
4671 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79); in California the applicable statute is CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1979); for New York see N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
"See text accompanying notes 144-207 infra.
'3The September 25, 1978 collision in San Diego, of a Pacific Southwest
Airlines Boeing 727 and a single-engine Cessna, resulting in the death of at
least 150 persons presents a situation close to the one hypothesized. PSA, the
nation's largest intrastate airline, is a California domiciliary, as were many of the
victims of the crash. Of course, this situation is complicated, to a certain
extent, in the cases where passengers were not from California. See Collision
Course, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1978, at 48-53; Death over San Diego, TIME, Oct.
9, 1978, at 16-20.
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eminent employees" and others, who usually are domiciled in
different states. Therefore, air disasters, such as the recent crash
of a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 at Chicago's O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport in which more than 270 lives were lost,"' can result
in hundreds of lawsuits scattered throughout the country, requir-
ing the application of a variety of state laws."
State laws applicable to air disaster litigation can conflict on
at least the following issues: the interpretation of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur; warranties which are recognized; privity require-
ments for standing to sue; the duty of care owed by carriers in
negligence actions; recovery provisions; damages which are com-
pensable; persons who may benefit; and the mode of distribution."'
Because the substantive law applied in these cases has not de-
veloped uniformly in all states, the parties are in a position to
argue for application of that state's law which they find most
beneficial."
To complicate matters further, states are in disagreement on the
proper choice of law rule to be applied." There are currently
"The litigation arising from the air disaster at Tenerife is an excellent
example. In the section 1407 proceedings for 40 of the actions, for example, the
court noted that the defendants included: KLM and Pan Am, Boeing, Royal Cruise
Lines, the booking agent for the Pan Am flight, the Government of Spain, the
insurance underwriter of the airport authority and the surviving pilot and first
officer of the Pan Am aircraft. Actions were transferred from the Northern
District of California, the Central District of California, the Northern District
of Illinois, the District of Alaska, the Eastern District of California, the Dis-
trict of Arizona, the Western District of Washington and the District of Puerto
Rico to the Southern District of New York. Two of the actions pending in the
Northern District of California were class actions. In re Air Crash Disaster at
Tenerife, Canary Islands, on March 27, 1977, 435 F. Supp. 927 (J.P.M.D.L.
1977).
"1How Safe?, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 1979, at 34; Saving Sense of Paranoia,
TIME, June 11, 1979, at 18.
0The Chicago air crash, for example, claimed the lives of passengers from
fifteen states and five foreign countries. Based on data provided in The Washing-
ton Post, May 27, 1979, at A20, col. 1. For a discussion of another such incident
see Disaster in the Courts, supra note 6, at 661-62. See also Tydings, supra note
6, at 299-300; Judicial Solution, supra note 6, at 232-33.
" See generally Disaster in the Courts, supra note 6, at 671-74.
2 Id. at 668.
"2See generally Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963
DUKE L.J. 1, reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 690, 690-742 (1963); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 173-95
(3d ed. 1977); Tydings, supra note 6, at 302; Judicial Solution, supra note 6, at
234-36.
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three widely accepted conflicts theories' which, with their varia-
tions as applied by individual states, can result in inconsistent de-
terminations of the substantive law to be applied in air crash cases.
Until the 1960's all states followed the traditional conflicts doctrine
of lex loci delicti," which calls- for application of the law of the
place where the tort occurred." A court employing this doctrine,
therefore, looks to the law of the place of the crash!' or of the
place where the tortious act, such as defective manufacture, "' has
occurred. While lex loci results in uniformity and predictability,
its critics, point out that "the situs of an accident . . . is often
merely fortuitous,"" so that the rule ignores other factors or in-
fluences which may be present, " at times yielding "harsh, unneces-
sary and unjust results.""1 '
Dissatisfaction with the lex loci rule resulted in the emergence,
"4These are: (1) lex loci delicti, which looks to the law of the jurisdiction
where the tort occurred; (2) "significant contacts," in which the court evaluates
certain contacts, in order to determine which state has the most significant rela-
tionship to a particular issue; and (3) "governmental interest," in which the
court compares the policies of the concerned states and the interests of the liti-
gants "to determine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue involved."
(Citations omitted). Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 554, 432 P.2d 727, 730,
63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34 (1967). See note 93 supra; Bailey & Broder, Choice of Law-
Mass Disaster Cases Involving Diversity of Citizenship, 38 J. Am L. & COM.
285 (1972); Disaster in the Courts, supra note 6, at 670-71.
'5This theory was developed most fully by Professor Joseph H. Beale, and
incorporated in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICr OF LAws (1934); R. LEFLAR,
supra note 93, at 173. See J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
" See, e.g., Jiminez Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 574 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.
1978); Griese-Traylor Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 572 F.2d 1039
(5th Cir. 1978); Tolson v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 335
(S.D. Tex. 1975); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966);
Burke v. Lappin, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 299 N.E.2d 729 (1973).
" See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973,
399 F. Supp. 1106, 1115 (D. Mass. 1975); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (N.D. IlI. 1969) (only on issue of whether in fact a tort
was committed); Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 119, 121 (N.D.
Ga. 1966).
" See Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (referred to place where aircraft manufactured, sold and delivered on
breach of warranty claim).
"Tydings, supra note 6, at 300.
l"5Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 131, 286 N.E.2d 454, 459, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64, 72 (1972) (Breitel, J., concurring).
"0'Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 11, 203 A.2d 796, 801 (1964).
See also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 912 (1963); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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in 1963,"2 of the "significant contacts" or "significant relationship"
approach,"° which evaluates various contacts, in addition to the
place where the tort occurred, "according to their relative import-
ance with respect to the particular issue."'" In In re Air Crash Dis-
aster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973," the federal
court sitting in Massachusetts was required to choose between a
Massachusetts statute," which limited damages to $200,000, and
a Vermont statute,' which contained no such limitation. After
determining that Vermont had abandoned lex loci in favor of the
new "significant contacts" rule, 8 the court determined that the
following contacts with Vermont were present: the decedents
were domiciled in Vermont; their estates were being probated
there; the next of kin of decedents, for whose benefit damages
were recoverable, resided there; and the decedents purchased their
tickets, boarded the aircraft and expected to return there. The
crash itself occurred in Massachusetts, and the airline did business
'0 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963). See Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Auten
v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
103 See generally Cook, The Logic and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,
33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Re-
flections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947);
Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
736 (1924).
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 145 (1971). The con-
tacts to be taken into account include: (a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties;
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Id. See Lewis v. Chemetron Corp., 448 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1978); General
principles governing this determination include "considerations relative to the
interests of each state in having its law applied to the issue, the needs and
interests of the parties, the needs of judicial administration, the promotion of
interstate order and the basic policies underlying the field of law." In re Air
Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106,
1111 (D. Mass. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6
(1971). See also Semmelroth v. American Airlines, 448 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Ill.
1978); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (on issue of damages); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp.
1166, 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (on effect of release).
105 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Mass. 1975).
Il 1972 Mass. Acts ch. 440, § 1 (current version at MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
229, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974)).
107VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (1974).
108399 F. Supp. at 1108-11.
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in both Massachusetts and Vermont."°
The court then proceeded to evaluate the policies underlying the
potentially applicable statutes, determining that the Vermont statute
was clearly compensatory, that the Massachusetts statute was puni-
tive and that application of the Massachusetts statute would frus-
trate Vermont's compensatory policy.1" After noting that Vermont
had a strong interest in assuring the compensation of next of
kin for tortious deaths of its residents and that Massachusetts had
no interest to be furthered by application of its punitive statute,"'
the court determined that Massachusetts' sole contact, the crash of
the aircraft, did not outweigh the numerous contacts and interests
which Vermont had in the case." ' Therefore, the court applied
Vermont law.
The "significant contacts" approach, however, quickly became
a target for criticism, the most common complaint being that
courts tended to mechanically count contacts with little additional
analysis."3 One result of this criticism was the emergence of a
third approach, the "governmental interest" test,"' in which a
9 Id. at 1112.
110 Id.
"I Massachusetts had repealed the punitive death statute shortly after the crash
and replaced it with a compensatory wrongful death act which did not limit
damages. MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974).
1"2 399 F. Supp. at 1112.
" See B. CURRIE, supra note 93, at 39-40, where the author states, "The
[significant contacts] theory provides no standard for determining what 'contacts'
are significant, nor for appraising the relative significance of the respective
groups of 'contacts' . . . One 'contact' seems to be about as good as another
for almost any purpose. The 'contacts' are totted up and a highly subjective fiat
is issued to the effect that one group of contacts or the other is the more sig-
nificant." See also A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 351, 464 (2d ed. 1962):
"[T]he formula is circular since the significance of the relationship is the very
question which the conflicts rule has to answer . . . in all these formulas what
should be a conclusion reached by the use of a rule of choice of law . . . is
offered to us as a premise for the choice."; R. LEFLAR, supra note 93, at 183.
14 This approach should not be confused with the "governmental interest" ap-
proach espoused by Professor Brainerd Currie. While both require an analysis of a
state's concern with respect to any fact-law issue, the Currie approach establishes
whether the forum state has an interest, and if it does, will apply the forum
state's rule, regardless of the interests of the other states. In choices between
non-forum states the Currie approach would apply the rule most like that of
the forum state. Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, 28 U. Cm. L. Rv.
258, 290-94 (1961), reprinted in B. CUtaR, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAws 584, 621-26 (1963). The "governmental interest" approach which has
been adopted often weighs the competing governmental interests and applies the
law of the state whose interest is deemed to be greatest. R. LEFLAR, supra note
93, at 185.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
court identifies the states or countries which have an interest in
a particular issue and then analyzes the relevant substantive laws
to determine the underlying public policies."' When the policies
of two states are in competition, the court must weigh the com-
peting interests and then make its determination."' This analysis
must be performed for each issue in the case.
The "governmental interest" approach was, utilized in In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,1' a case heard in California, in-
volving four defendants, three of whom were either residents of or
had substantial contacts with California."' In determining the
measure of damages, the federal court began its analysis by
recognizing that the decedents came from a total of thirty-six
jurisdictions."' It then proceeded to analyze the policies of the
various jurisdictions represented, noting that California, the forum,
had a definite interest in applying its own law, which would be
displaced only if there was a compelling reason for doing so."
The interests of California were identified as follows: (1) com-
pensation of resident survivors; (2) deterrence of tortious conduct
of resident defendants; (3) avoidance of the imposition of ex-
cessive financial burdens on resident defendants; and (4) provi-
"'Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975); Moore v.
Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432
P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
11" Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975); Moore v.
Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432
P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). It has been suggested that, not only should
competing state interests be analyzed, but also that an approach is needed which is
sensitive to all interests, state and federal. See Craig & Alexander, Wrongful Death
in Aviation and the Admiralty; Problems of Federalism, Tempests and Teapots, 37
J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 13 (1971). The approach advocated in the cited article bal-
ances the various state and federal interests without regard to "euphemistic dangers
affecting the balance of state-national relationships . . ." and "if this analysis re-
veals a problem in which the federal government has concern, and in which the
application of state law would interfere with that concern, federal law should be
applied." Id. at 13.
117 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
18 Cases had also been transferred in from other jurisdictions under the
multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1407 (1976). The court stated that
there was "no substantial difference" in the choice of laws concerning liability
and damages between the respective transferor states and the forum, thereby
avoiding a separate determination for those cases. Id. at 749.
1"9 Id. at 741.
120 Id. at 742.
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sion of a uniform rule of liability and damages for those who come
under the ambit of California's strict liability law."' The court,
however, did not analyze the policies of each of the remaining
jurisdictions individually. Rather, the court noted that, insofar as
the plaintiffs were concerned, the general interest of each of these
states in a wrongful-death action was to provide for compensation
and to determine the distribution of proceeds to local decedents
and beneficiaries.22
The court proceeded to weigh the various interests which it had
identified. The court reasoned that in cases where foreign standards
would permit a greater recovery than the forum, the forum's inter-
est in protecting resident defendants would prevail, since the rights
of plaintiffs in those cases would vest solely because of the fortuit-
ous place of the crash or the residence of the litigants."' In cases
where foreign standards would limit recovery, the court stated
that those jurisdictions had no interest in having their law applied,
since they had no resident defendants to protect. ' Rather, their
interests in compensation were satisfied as long as full recovery
was allowed under California law."
Choice of laws creates particular problems when suit is brought
in federal court. Erie" requires the application of the substantive
law of the forum state in diversity cases, including its conflicts
rule."' Therefore, under the least complicated set of circumstances,
"' Id. at 743. The court later added that "the United States government has as
much, or greater, interest in the products which it certifies as airworthy, as any
state or any nation ... to insure that anyone coming within the ambit of strict
products liability shall know that its liability for a defect shall be uniform ..
Id. at 746.
2 Id. at 743.
13 Id. at 744.
I" Id. at 743.
"5 Id. at 745.
1- 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
12"See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 387 (1941). This may
not be the case, however, in litigation which stems from a maritime loss. For
example, Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968), held that federal choice of law principles should
apply if the tort is maritime. See Thomas, Maritime Aviation Losses and Con-
flict of Laws, 45 J. Am L. & CoM. 61, 72 (1979). The author notes, however,
that "[s]tate substantive law is not always dispensed [with] in maritime cases.
If the matter thought maritime is local in scope so as not to require uniform and
harmonious working of the federal maritime legal system, the court may resort
to state law." Id. at 71.
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a federal court must analyze the various choice of laws issues
already discussed.' 8 A federal court's task, however, may be
complicated significantly. For example, the federal judge may
be required to predict a change in the state's conflicts rule,"
as was the case in In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachu-
setts," where the court determined that Vermont had finally aban-
doned lex loci in favor of "significant contacts..' ...
One procedural advantage of federal courts is the ability to
consolidate multiple actions through the use of the venue pro-
visionsP' and the transfer provisions of the Multidistrict Litigation
Statute.'" These devices, however, create even more problems for
the federal judge, since the transfer constitutes merely a "change
of courtrooms.' The transferee court is still required to apply
the substantive law, including the choice of law rule, of each
original forum state."
In the Boston air crash litigation," for example, cases were trans-
ferred to the federal district court in Massachusetts from district
courts in New Hampshire, Vermont, Florida, and New York under
the Multidistrict Litigation Statute." ' The conflicts doctrine of
' Disaster in the Courts, supra note 6, at 671.
2 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 13, 1973,
399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295
F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. I11. 1969). See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
130399 F. Supp. 1106, 1108-11 (D. Mass. 1975).
1 Ironically, the federal court's judgment may be repudiated by a subsequent
state proceeding, once again causing inconsistency between different courts de-
ciding similar issues. See Judicial Solution, supra note 6, at 236.
'2 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
"-28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). Transfer under this section, however, is solely
for purposes of pretrial proceedings, with remand to the transferor court required
for trial. This limitation has, on occasion, been circumvented by the transferee
court. One manner in which this may be accomplished is by ordering a section
1404 transfer of "common fact" cases for all purposes, subject to the limitation
that the actions "might have been brought" in the transferee district. Disaster in
the Courts, supra note 6, at 668. See Speiser, Dynamics of Airline Crash Litiga-
tion: What Makes the Cases Move?, 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 565, 569-83 (1977);
Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 1001, 1017-23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Multidistrict Panel]; Judicial
Solution, supra note 6, at 238.
134Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
"'See Tydings, supra note 6, at 302.
1" In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973, 399
F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
'13 Id.
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each state required a different analysis in order to determine
whether the Massachusetts damage limitation applied. The court
found the following: Massachusetts followed lex loci; New Hamp-
shire employed an interest analysis test;" Vermont had adopted
"significant contacts," abandoning lex loci,"9 Florida's conflicts
rule was unclear, but Florida courts would refuse to grant comity
to the Massachusetts rule;1" and New York's rule looked to the
domicile of the decedents." The final outcome was that the limita-
tion upon recovery would apply to the Massachusetts cases,' " but
not to the New Hampshire, Vermont, Florida and New York
cases."
B. A Proposal for Uniformity
The present system for air crash litigation engenders a great
deal of waste, inefficiency, and even injustice. Judicial resources
are wasted in multiple proceedings on identical fact issues, re-
quiring identification and interpretation of numerous state laws,' "
among which there is a great deal of inconsistency.' This situa-
tion often leads, as in the Boston air crash litigation, " to incon-
sistent damage awards or recovery for some claimants and not






143 Id. at 1112, 1115, 1119, and 1122.
'"See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
14 See Tydings, supra note 6, at 304. The author observes that in litigation
arising out of an air crash into Boston Harbor the trials in Pennsylvania alone
had required "some 65 days of jury time and over 80 days of judicial time,
exclusive of the time spent on appeals." Id.
1In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts on July 31, 1973, 399
F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
4
" See Judicial Solution, supra note 6, at 237. See also Gabel v. Hughes Air
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972), wherein Judge Peirson M. Hall
observed:
It would be a rank injustice to require each of the cases arising
out of the 50 deaths to be tried twice, once here and once in the
state courts where each defendant would have a chance to and
would blame the other. In this forum, conceivably, the United
States might be exculpated and in the state forum Air West might
be exculpated, thus leaving plaintiffs nothing.
Id. at 624.
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identical evidence on the same issues. Furthermore, the modem
approaches to choice of laws defy predictable results, and thus
add to the waste of judicial resources and inhibit settlements by
confusing the parties as to which recovery limitations, if any,
apply.2'"
One solution to this predicament is the drafting of a set of uni-
form state laws for air disaster cases. This is far from being a
novel idea. The National Commission on Uniform State Laws has
recommended such action at least twice.1 ' Yet, there is little likeli-
hood that enough of the fifty state legislatures would be willing
to abandon their current wrongful-death recovery provisions in
favor of such a proposal.' Furthermore, even if a uniform state
act were adopted, the numerous procedural problems found in
multi-state, multi-trial litigation would remain."
A more comprehensive solution, and one clearly mandated in
the face of the bill to abolish diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,"
is the creation of a federal cause of action with respect to air
disasters. Access to federal courts could be provided under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, '" eliminating reliance on diversity of citizenship' "
or other jurisdictional devices." In addition, the monumental con-
flict of laws problems would be eliminated.'"
148 See Tydings, supra note 6, at 304. Since insurers base premiums on the
most unfavorable standards, this circumstance also increases the cost of airline
liability coverage. Id. See also Craig & Alexander, supra note 116, at 8.
'
4 9 See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY EIGHTH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE 68-94 (1938); HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTy FIFTH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 179-80 (1956).
10 Tydings, supra note 6, at 308.
1"1 Id.
"52 See text accompanying notes 8 and 9 supra.
1-28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no such
sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against
the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee
thereof in his official capacity.
1'28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). See note 10 supra.
155 See text accompanying notes 205-317 infra.
150 See text accompanying notes 87-143 supra.
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Congress has the authority to take this action under the powers
granted to it by the commerce clause.' Moreover, the perva-
sive statutory and regulatory scheme, including the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958,"' the regulations of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration"' and the Civil Aeronautics Board,1" clearly indicates
a strong congressional interest in aviation activities.
In 1968 and 1969 Senator Joseph D. Tydings introduced legis-
lation.' for the creation of a federal cause of action in air disaster
cases." ' These bills provided for exclusive original federal court
jurisdiction, as well as judicial development of the substantive
law to be applied. Although extensive hearings were held, the
legislation was never reported out of committee. '" Senator Tydings'
bills were opposed for a number of reasons."' Some opponents saw
the bills as an intrusion into an area where the states should be free
to innovate." There were also the following substantive objections
to these bills: the one-year statute of limitations was felt to be too
short; the bill adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence, while
critics preferred comparative negligence; and exclusive federal juris-
diction tightened the standards for jury verdicts, requiring unani-
57 Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 (1954);
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Wright, supra note 34, at 330, wherein the
author states:
Bluntly stated, in major respects the federal government is no longer
a government of limited powers. Changes in social reality and in
judicial interpretation of several key rubrics of Article I constitu-
tional authority makes it possible for the federal government to
legislate pervasively in almost any area; state law, in many of the
eddies where it does still govern, is no more secure than a tenancy
at will, terminable at Washington's pleasure.
1 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, as
amended 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
"' 14 C.F.R. §§ 1-199.11 (1978).
'"14 C.F.R. §§ 200-399.101 (1978).
"'S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S, 3305, S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968).
"' Hearings on S. 961, Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
Hearings on S. 3305, S. 3306 and S. 4089 Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968).
6 Judicial Solution, supra note 6, at 239.
I"See Sanders, The Tydings Bill, 36 J. Am L. & CoM. 550 (1970).
I's Id. at 553. Under the present system "[t]he various independent jurisdictions
are free to shape and mold their jurisprudence in accordance with their view of
the better rule of law." Id.
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mity among the twelve person federal jury as opposed to the non-
unanimous verdicts permitted in a number of state courts.' Finally,
it was felt that the bills did not give the federal judiciary sufficient
guidance as to the substantive rules to be applied, leaving to the
judiciary too much discretion for the formulation of the law, with
resulting inconsistencies among the various circuits. 6 7
On January 15, 1979, Representative George E. Danielson in-
troduced legislation"8 similar to Senator Tydings' proposals of a
decade ago. The bill specifically provides for concurrent original
federal jurisdiction '6 in the following cases: (1) when the action
arises out of or in the course of aviation activity by designated
types of aircraft;'" (2) when the action arises out of aviation
activity which results in the death of five or more persons;1' (3)
when the action arises under new chapter 174,'" which governs
aviation activity resulting in loss or injury;"'3 or (4) when the action
arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act.'"
166 Id. at 554-57.
""See Comment, Federal Courts-Proposed Aircraft Crash Litigation Legis-
lation, 35 Mo. L. REv. 215, 221-25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Aircraft Crash
Legislation].
'"H.R. 231, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 231];
125 CONG. REC. H163 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979).
169H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 1364(a). Compare with the Tydings pro-
posals, supra note 161, which provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction. See
text accompanying notes 164 and 166 supra.
.
7
.H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 1364(a)(1). The designated aircraft in-
clude: (A) large aircraft, id. 5 1364(a)(1)(A), defined as aircraft of more than
12,500 lbs. maximum certificated takeoff weight, or of a seating capacity of
more than 10 persons, id. § 1364(c)(1)(B); (B) high performance aircraft, id.
S 1364(a)(1)(B), defined as a jet or rocket-powered aircraft of more than
6,000 lbs. maximum certificated takeoff weight or turbine-powered aircraft of
more than 8,000 lbs. maximum certificated takeoff weight, id. § 1364(c) (1) (C);
(C) public aircraft, id. § 1364(a)(1)(C), defined as including an aircraft being
researched, developed, tested, evaluated or manufactured for the United States
in addition to any other aircraft included in the term "public aircraft" as defined
in 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976), H.R. 231 supra note 168, at § 1364(c)(1)(E);
(D) common carrier aircraft, id. § 1364(a)(1)(D), defined as aircraft engaged
in the carriage of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation
or hire. Id. § 1364(c)(1)(A).
I" H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 1364(a)(1).





4 Id. § 1364(a)(4). See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which provides for exclusive rather than concurrent original juris-
diction in federal courts for actions or claims against the United States. See text
accompanying notes 208-250 infra.
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This new bill provides that, subject to certain exceptions, "the
rules of such body of law shall be the consensus of decisions of
courts of competent jurisdiction in cases or controversies, subject
to any other applicable federal law or treaty."'"9 This provision,
which presumably contemplates the creation of a federal common
law" for air disaster cases, may not satisfy the arguments of prior
critics who felt that Tydings' bills contained insufficient guidance
on the rules of law to be applied." ' Their argument, however, begs
the question. For years litigants have found federal judges to be
sufficiently competent..8 to decide questions of state law, often
where there was little state law precedent for guidance.' " The major
difference in this case, where federal common law is being de-
veloped, is that the decision of the federal court would have pre-
cedential value.
The bill also establishes a number of procedural devices which
are designed to streamline air crash litigation. In particular, one
provision expands the function of proceedings to which actions are
transferred under the Multidistrict Litigation Statute," ' to include,
"any or all purposes, as well as for pretrial proceedings.... This
device would eliminate much of the waste which results when
identical issues are tried in multiple proceedings.
The proposed legislation contains more liberal venue provisions
than those generally in force in federal courts.l' While the venue
provisions applicable to federal question' " cases generally permit
179H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 2751(a). The bill does, however, set forth
the rule that, "it is the duty of a common carrier to exercise the highest degree
of care for the safety of its passengers." Id. § 2751(b).
178 Federal common law is developed in the absence of a controlling federal
statute, where there is an overriding national interest deleting a need for uniform
results. See note 312 infra.
177 See Aircraft Crash Litigation, supra note 167, at 223.
178 See text accompanying notes 27-38 supra.
179 See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
ISoSee note 131 supra. While there may initially be a danger of variance
among the circuits in the development of the federal common law regarding avia-
tion activities, the inconsistencies most likely would be resolved by the court of
final resort. Nevertheless, there would be far more uniformity under the federal
common law approach than there is in a system relying on the laws of fifty
jurisdictions.
18128 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
1  H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 1408.
18328 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
18428 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
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actions to be brought only in the judicial district where all the
defendants reside, or where the claim arose, 1" the new bill would
liberalize this rule by also permitting suit to be brought where the
plaintiff resides or has his or its principal place of business, as
well as at certain other specified places 86
In addition, the Danielson bill would provide for removal of
actions to the federal district court by any party to the action."'
The current removal statute restricts the option of removal to the
defendant."' In cases not founded on federal questions, an addi-
tional limitation permits removal only if none of the defendants
is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought.9
The new bill also provides, in actions commencing in federal
district court, that process other than subpoenas may be served
"at any place,"'" thus circumventing the limitations contained in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' A subpoena to testify at
a hearing or trial also could be served by order of the court "at
any place beyond the limits under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."'' . Hence, all parties could be brought together in one
proceeding for full trial of the issues, without regard to geographic
boundaries.""
8528 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
... H.R. 231, supra note 168, at S 1408(a)(1). The additional places are: (1)
the place where the takeoff or landing out of which or in the course of which the
claim arose; (2) the place in which occurs the landing made at the end of the
aircraft flight out of which or in the course of which the claim arose. H.R. 231,
supra note 168, at S 1408(a)(1).
"'This provision would be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1364, H.R. 231, supra
note 168, at § 1452.
188 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
1828 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
I"H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 2764(1).
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), which normally limits service of process to the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held plus a "100 mile
bulge" from the place where the action is commenced, to out-of-state locations.
"'. H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 2764(2).
"'The effect of the liberalized removal provisions (see text accompanying
note 187 supra) combined with the consolidation provisions of proposed § 1408
(see text accompanying note 182 supra) and the expanded area for service of
process (see text accompanying notes 190-192 supra) is to facilitate consolidation
of all actions, whether commenced in federal court, or in state court, in one
judicial proceeding. The ability to transfer an action commenced in a California
state court to a federal district court in New York may raise questions of
fundamental fairness. Abuse would be minimized, however, by a provision re-
ferring to § 1407(a) for factors to be considered. H.R. 231, § 1408(b)(2).
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Substantively, the bill would confer a right of action to recover
for property loss, for personal injury and for wrongful death aris-
ing out of, or in the course of, aviation activity.'" It would limit
eligible beneficiaries in actions for wrongful death and/or per-
sonal injury to the decedent's surviving spouse, children, parents
or dependent relatives." To determine the priorities of the various
beneficiaries, the bill looks to the law of the state where the de-
cedent was domiciled at the time of death.9' Provision is made for
recovery of pecuniary losses, including loss of care, comfort and
society, but the bill would specifically exclude damages for pain,
suffering or disfigurement."" It also would prohibit any limitation
on the amount of recovery, except as otherwise provided by treaty
or other federal law."' Finally, the personal representative of the
decedent would be able to initiate actions on behalf of the eligible
beneficiaries."'
Representative Danielson's bill should gain wider acceptance
than the earlier bills. First, the bill incorporates many of the im-
provements suggested for Senator Tydings' bills, including a two-
year, rather than a one-year statute of limitations,"' and the adop-
tion of the rule of comparative fault, rather than contributory
negligence." Second, if diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is abol-
Section 1407(a) requires a "determination that transfers for such proceedings
will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions." 28 U.S.C. S 1407(a) (1976). But cf.
Multidistrict Panel, supra note 133, at 1008, wherein the authors note that the
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation applies these standards in regard to the
litigation as a whole, rather than to identical parties who may be hurt or dis-
advantaged by the transfer. Id. Nevertheless, the prevailing interest seems to be
judicial savings, and there is an assumption that when these result, the litigants
will also realize savings. The effective use of nationwide service of process in
interpleader actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976) indicates that such a pro-
vision could be implemented smoothly in air crash cases with a minimum of
constitutional objection.
"'H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 2752(a)(1).
"'Id. S 2752(b).
"Id. § 2752(c).
"71d. § 2752(d). The exclusive language of the bill seems to preclude re-
covery of these damages in a collateral state proceeding. See Aircraft Crash
Litigation, supra note 167, at 221.
I' H.R. 231, supra note 168, at § 2752(d).
"9Id. 5 2762(a).
- Id. 5 2753.
tm ld. 5 2752(a)(1) (A).
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ished," Congress might see fit to provide an alternative basis for
federal jurisdiction over air disaster cases.'
The proposed legislation would eliminate many of the difficul-
ties currently encountered by all involved in air crash cases.
Consolidation of actions would be easily facilitated, eliminating
much of the waste which results from multiple proceedings. Further-
more, the Danielson bill would eliminate the choice of law prob-
lems currently encountered by federal judges in domestic air dis-
aster cases. Finally, the bill provides for a federal jurisdictional
basis, should the current campaign for the abolition of diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction succeed.
III. ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL BASES
When Senator Tydings first introduced a proposal for a federal
statutory scheme to govern air disaster cases, one of his argu-
ments was that these new jurisdictional provisions would not re-
sult in any unnecessary increase in federal court jurisdiction.' 4
He noted that the participation of the United States in aviation
activities and the diversity of citizenship between the parties to a
suit combined to bring most air disaster cases into the federal
courts.' The setting has changed, however, and Congress is now
examining ways to reduce federal court congestion, one of which
is the abolition of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. If the anti-
diversity bill is enacted and the air crash litigation bill is not,
considerable jurisdictional problems may arise, forcing litigants
to identify alternative jurisdictional bases for trial in federal court.
The following sections will discuss two of the alternative bases
for federal jurisdiction over air disaster cases. These are joining
the United States as a defendant04 and invoking federal question
jurisdiction.'"'
A. The United States as a Defendant
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act,0' the federal district courts
202 H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See text accompanying notes 2-5
supra.
"I See Tydings, supra note 6, at 310-11.
20 4Tydings, supra note 6, at 310.
m'Id. at 311.
2028 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
20728 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
20828 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
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have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions when the United States
is a defendant. The Act is applicable to these cases when "the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."' In air disaster litigation the United States is often a
defendant on grounds such as control tower negligence" ° or
"wrongful approval, certification, inspection, and the like, of the
plane, or failure to do so.""'
In these cases, an important issue is whether a federal court,
having determined that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the
cause of action between the plaintiff and the United States, can
take pendent jurisdiction over state claims against the other de-
fendants. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs," the plaintiff charged
that the union had wrongfully pressured his employer to fire him,
thus asserting a federal claim under the Taft-Hartley Act" and
a state claim of unlawful conspiracy to interfere with his employ-
ment contract. The Supreme Court stated that the federal court
had pendent jurisdiction to hear the state claim since both claims
"derive from a common nucleus of operative fact ' " and the
pendent claims were such that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."" The Court
stated further that, in making the determination regarding pendent
claims, a trial court should look to "considerations of judicial eco-
nomy, convenience and fairness to litigants.2 .. According to the
Court, one significant constraint, however, is that a trial court
should avoid needless decisions of state law, "both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring
for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law...'
The Gibbs criteria are met in air disaster cases where the United
States is a defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
2-28 U.S.C. S 1346(b) (1976).
0 Moloney v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
, In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 737 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
2 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
21229 U.S.C. S 158(a)(2), (b)(4) (1976).
214 383 U.S. at 725.
215 Id.
210 Id. at 726.
217 Id.
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"common nucleus of operative fact, 218 as required by Gibbs, is
the air crash itself. Moreover, considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants are met in air disaster cases
through the savings which result from a single trial of the com-
bined issues. Federal courts have traditionally recognized the po-
tential for administrative savings through a variety of consolidation
devices. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,1 ' for ex-
ample, has granted practically all requests for a section 1407
transfer. 20 In addition, it would be patently unfair to compel a
defendant to litigate multiple actions arising from the same factual
occurrence in state and federal courts because some of the claims
are federal and some are state-based. If multiple proceedings are
held in both state and federal courts, the litigants risk obtaining
conflicting results with regard to additional defendants. It is, there-
fore, more expedient to try all the issues in one judicial proceed-
ing. Moreover, when a federal court has exclusive original jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act,"1 it is only in federal
court that the plaintiff can bring all his claims together." There-
fore, in light of considerations of judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to litigants, a federal court, in finding that pendent
jurisdiction exists over the state claims, is not making needless
decisions of state law. There are, of course, occasions where,
28 Id. at 725.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
220E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport in
Denver, Colorado, on August 7, 1975, 447 F. Supp. 1071 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978);
In re Helicopter Crash in Germany on September 26, 1975, 443 F. Supp. 447
(J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands, on
March 27, 1977, 435 F. Supp. 927 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In re Air Crash at Pago
Pago, American Samoa, on January 30, 1974, 424 F. Supp. 1075 (J.P.M.D.L.
.1977). See Multidistrict Panel, supra note 133, at 1010.
21 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976); Transok Pipeline Co. v.
Darks, 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978);
Pearce v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 613 (D. Kan. 1978); Santoni v. United
States, 450 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Md. 1978); Hipp v. United States, 313 F.
Supp. 1152, 1155 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
22228 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). Section 1346(b) would apply, since all fifty
states have wrongful death statutes, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 5 126 at 902 (4th ed. 1971), under which the United States can be liable.
At one of the few points in which air disaster litigation was discussed during the
1978 hearings on a bill to abolish diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, Rep.
Danielson of California suggested that jurisdiction would remain in federal court
in virtually all air crash cases, due to the federal government's activities with
respect to aviation. Hearings, supra note 4, at 76-77.
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arguably, the negligence upon which the claim against the United
States is based is independent of the incident which has initiated
the litigation." Yet, even in these situations, the policy which dic-
tates that duplication of judicial efforts should be avoided suggests
that consolidation is appropriate. '
One obstacle to the application of pendent jurisdiction is that
Gibbs requires a substantive federal question before a federal court
has power to hear a pendent state claim. "' In actions under the
Federal Tort Claims Act the court applies state law and the appli-
cation of the Federal Tort Claims Act does not pose a federal
question.'" In Wheelwright v. United States, 27 a suit against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, however, the
court exercised pendent jurisdiction over state claims against addi-
tional defendants where there was no federal question, finding
greater significance in the fact that claims against the United
States and the additional defendants arose out of the same accident
and that they required the same proof concerning liability' Fur-
thermore, in Aldinger v. Howard,' Justice Rehnquist indicated
that actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act might be appropri-
ate for pendent jurisdiction for reasons of judicial economy and
convenience, coupled with the fact that federal courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction in these cases.'
22
' The question presented, though related to the plaintiff's original action,
may, however, be merely a by-product of the case. See Kinsella v. Board of
Education, 402 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); Hendrickson v. Wilson, 374
F. Supp. 865, 878 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
22 Of course, this is discretionary in the district court. See Kinsella v. Board
of Education, 402 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1975). Where the claim against
the United States is remotely connected to the state claims, and the "state claim
constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage,
the state claim may fairly be dismissed." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 727 (1966).
21 See Wheelwright v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 627, 630 (D. Utah 1976);
Lawes v. Nutter, 292 F. Supp. 890, 891 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
21 Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 434
U.S. 814 (1977), cert. dism'd, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Williams v. United States,
405 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1969); Sanborn v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 651,
654 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Mickelic v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp.
1036, 1039-40 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
227 409 F. Supp. 627, 631 (D. Utah 1976).
21 Id. If the relief sought or the theory of recovery is different in the two
causes of action, however, the court should decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction,
even though both claims arise from the same occurrence. Id.
229427 U.S. 1 (1976).
m Id. at 18.
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Even though it appears reasonable to conclude that pendent
jurisdiction should be exercised over pendent parties, in actions
against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
where there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, this
has not been clearly established under present case law." In
Aldinger the Supreme Court specifically disapproved of the applica-
tion of pendent jurisdiction to join a county as a defendant in a
civil rights action.' In that case, however, the Court limited its
opinion to the particular facts before it.' Under those facts, the
Court had construed the relevant statute as excluding counties from
liability, and it had seen the attempt to utilize pendent jurisdiction
as a device for circumventing the legislative intent.' The Court
pointed out, however, that "[o]ther statutory grants and other align-
ments of parties and claims might call for a different result."'
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist declined to make "any sweeping
pronouncement upon the existence or exercise of such jurisdic-
tion. '  He chose, instead, to suggest a test by which future courts
might decide the matter: "[B]efore it can be concluded that such
jurisdiction exists, a federal court must satisfy itself not only that
Article III permits it, but that Congress in the statutes conferring
jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its ex-
istence." '
Since Aldinger a number of courts have applied this test and
231 For cases applying the concept of pendent party jurisdiction in Federal
Tort Claims actions, see Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577
F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3554 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1979)
(No. 78-736); Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1970). Contra Ayala v. United States,
550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977), cert. dism'd, 435
U.S. 982 (1978); Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir.
1976).
232 427 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983
(1976).
=427 U.S. at 18.
2 Id. at 16. This construction of the statute, however, was expressly over-
ruled in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2 13427 U.S. at 18.
2N Id.
" Id. Article III of the Constitution requires the identification of "Cases .. .
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and [its] treaties,"
U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, a requirement which Gibbs interpreted to include cases
bearing a "common nucleus of operative fact." 383 U.S. at 725.
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found that pendent party jurisdiction is appropriate in Federal
Tort Claims actions.' In Pearce v. United States,"" the federal
district court in Kansas permitted the joining of a private hospital
as a party defendant in a claim that the private hospital and a
Veterans Administration hospital, to which the plaintiff subse-
quently had gone, had been negligent in failing to render prompt
treatment to the plaintiff for injuries incurred in an automobile
accident. Similarly, in Santoni v. United States,' which was decided
by the federal district court in Maryland, the court permitted the
joining of pendent parties defendant in an action against the
United States.
In Maltais v. United States,' the plaintiff sued the United
States after her husband's fatal fall, in the course of his employ-
ment, from the roof of a building owned by the United States. The
plaintiff sought to have the court exercise pendent party jurisdiction
over seven corporate defendants, for the related nonfederal claims.
The federal court for the Northern District of New York found that
it had jurisdiction over the pendent parties, ' finding that Congress
specifically authorizes such suits in the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
First, the court noted that the grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts under the Act is exclusive, but includes the power to ad-
judicate "any set off, counterclaim or other claim or demand what-
ever on the part of the United States against any plaintiff."'" Sec-
ond, because of the relationship between the parties, the court
stated that the claims against all the defendants were intertwined,
resulting in the single incident which caused the death of the
plaintiff's husband. ' Third, it found that there was no circumven-
tion of congressional intent, no doing "indirectly what Congress
[had] determined should not be done directly."'" The court stated
238 Pearce v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 613, 618-20 (D. Kan. 1978); Santoni
v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 608, 611-12 (D. Md. 1978); Maltais v. United
States, 439 F. Supp. 540, 547-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
9450 F. Supp. 613 (D. Kan. 1978).
'"450 F. Supp. 608 (D. Md. 1978).
'"439 F. Supp. 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
.I/d. at 547.
Id. at 547-48.
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that since the Federal Tort Claims Act permits the United States
to implead a party who may have been liable to the United States
for all or part of a plaintiff's claim, it was very likely that had the
plaintiff not named the additional defendants in the complaint,
they still would have joined in the suit." Finally, the court found
that Congress intended to make the United States accountable for
its torts without undue delay, thus requiring a single federal forum
for the resolution of all Federal Tort Claims actions and "securing
a 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination.' "' The court found
no violation of article III, determining that all actions were within
the "one constitutional case"' 9 based on considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to all litigants.' °
If, in fact, the congressional intent under the Federal Tort Claims
Act is to provide a single federal forum for the resolution of claims
against pendent parties defendant as well as the United States, as
the Maltais court appears to indicate, this congressional intent is
arguably just as strong in air disaster cases. It is reasonable to con-
clude that claims against the United States and additional de-
fendants, arising out of a single air disaster, are intertwined and
should be adjudicated together. Therefore, joining the United
States as a defendant should enable plaintiffs to obtain federal
jurisdiction over their claims against all parties in an air disaster
case.
B. Federal Question
If a plaintiff asserts a federal right in his complaint, a federal
court may exercise jurisdiction over that claim." In the case of
247 Id.
2AS Id.
I Id. at 546, quoting from United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966). See note 237 supra.
I Id. at 550. The court ruled, however, that this was an initial determination,
made on a sparse record, and that facts subsequently brought out might compel
dismissal. Id.
2'U.S. CONsT. art. HI; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). The guidelines used to
determine whether or not plaintiff's claim asserts a cause of action that "arises
under" the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, were set out in
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). These are:
1) A right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the
United States must be an essential element of the plaintiff's cause
of action;
2) The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if
the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one con-
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air disaster litigation, however, the traditional remedies are state-
created." Nevertheless, at least one federal court has recognized
a "clearly articulated federal right in... plaintiffs to enforce rights
arising from their decedents' deaths when flying in planes which
allegedly are unsafe." 3 This right is derived from the pervasive
statutory scheme of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.'
Federal regulatory statutes often contain no explicit provision
for private rights of action when those statutes are violated. Fed-
eral courts, however, have at times inferred a private right of action
from the underlying purposes of a statute. For example, in J. I.
Case v. Borak," the Supreme Court found an implied right of
action for violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934," which governs proxy solicitation. It found that one
of the chief purposes of the Act was the protection of investors,"
pointing out that the legislative history of the Act showed that "it
was intended to 'control the conditions under which proxies may
be solicited, with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses
which... [had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
struction or effect and defeated if they receive another;
3) A genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible or con-
jectural one, must exist with reference thereto;
4) The controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the com-
plaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.
Id. at 112, 113.
2 USee note 85 supra.
2 In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 748 (C.D. Cal.
1975); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Contra
Peninsula Airport Comm'n v. National Airlines, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.
Va. 1977); Yelinek v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v.
Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp.
24 (N.D. Miss. 1960).
- 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976).
-377 U.S. 426 (1964).
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, S 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934)
(current version codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or
by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any
facility of any national securities exchange or otherwise to solicit
or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect to any security (other than an exempted
security) registered on any national securities exchange in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
2J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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stockholders.' "2" The Court reasoned that "[p]rivate enforcement
of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action" " in order to achieve the objectives of the legislation.
Finally, the Court announced a policy of affirmative enforcement
of regulatory rules: "[w]e, therefore, believe that under the cir-
cumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose.
''
More recently, in Cort v. Ash, " the Supreme Court addressed the
case of a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel Corporation who had filed
a derivative suit against the company's board of directors for
violations of a federal statute ' 2 which prohibits corporations from
making contributions in connection with specific federal elections.
The Court articulated a four-part test to determine whether a
private right of action can be implied from a federal statute, de-
clining to find that one existed in this case.' In the first part of the
test Justice Brennan examined the purposes of the statute to de-
termine who was intended to benefit from the statute. He found that
"the legislation was primarily concerned with corporations as a
source of aggregate wealth and therefore of possible corrupting
influence, and not directly with the internal relations between the
corporations and their stockholders."' " Stockholders, therefore,
were not the intended beneficiaries of the statute.
In the second part of the test he examined the statute's legisla-
tive history for signs of congressional intent to create a private
258 Id. at 431.
2 9 Id. at 432.
2 0ld. at 433.
-1422 U.S. 66 (1975).
- 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976).
26 422 U.S. at 78. The elements of the Cort analysis are:
(1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted?...
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?...
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . .
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
Federal Law?
Id.
422 U.S. at 82.
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right of action in favor of shareholders and found no such indica-
tion. ' In the third part of the test, Justice Brennan attempted to
determine whether recovery of damages for the statutory violation
would be consistent with the congressional purpose underlying the
legislation. He found that an award of damages would not "cure
the influence which the use of corporate funds in the first instance
may have had on a federal election"' and, therefore, would not
further the congressional purpose. In the final part of the test,
Justice Brennan questioned whether the cause of action was one
traditionally relegated to state law and was, in an area in which
the states, rather than the federal government, had a primary
interest. Justice Brennan stated that since the corporation was a
creature of state law, the federal court should leave identification
and enforcement of the shareholder's rights to the state." '
A federal court must apply the Cort analysis to determine
whether, in an air disaster case, a private right of action can be
implied from the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.' The first con-
dition of the Cort analysis is that the plaintiff must be "one of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."2" In
Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., a case decided before Cort, the
district court referred to the language of the Federal Aviation Act
to demonstrate that the overwhelming congressional interest in the
legislation was safety."1 After citing over twenty subdivisions of
that legislation, the court concluded that the intended beneficiaries
of this pervasive statutory scheme dealing with safety were the pas-
sengers of aircraft.2 ' This point is not disputed, even by those who
argue against an implied cause of action" for violation of safety
2aId.
266 Id. at 84.
26 7 Id.
-849 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976). A plaintiff, of course, cannot argue for
an implied right of action unless he can identify a violation of the provisions of
the Act or the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act dealing with safety,
and assert that the violation has caused the crash out of which the suit arises.
422 U.S. at 78.
370350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
271 350 F. Supp. at 617. See also In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,
399 F. Supp. 732, 748 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
2 1 350 F. Supp. at 617.
" See Aviation Tort Litigation, supra note 6, at 1091. See also Pillai, Nega-
tive Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts,
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provisions of the Act. It is clear, however, that courts will not
imply a private cause of action solely because the intent of a
statute is to benefit a particular class of individuals."
The second part of the test in Cort requires a court to determine
whether there is "any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one."" There
are rarely indications of such legislative intent with regard to any
federal regulatory statute."' Judge Peirson M. Hall, in Gabel v.
Hughes,"7 found that Congress implicitly intended to create a
private remedy for violation of the Federal Aviation Act. Judge
Hall found that violations of the safety provisions of the Act were
tantamount to tortious conduct. He stated further that because the
Act, in effect, defined certain conduct as tortious, a suit based on
that legislation was within the statute conferring jurisdiction on
federal courts for suits arising out of the laws of the United States,""
in spite of the fact that a state common law rule may have pre-
viously permitted suit for the same tortious conduct." In addition,
it has been suggested 2 that the Act itself, although specifically pro-
viding for the retention of existing common law and statutory
remedies, contemplates the need for enforcement by private suit.
21
The third part of the Cort test requires that the private remedy
implied be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme. At first glance, this part appears to be substantially
similar to the second part of the Cort test, which requires legislative
intent to provide a remedy. It recognizes, however, that while the
47 CIN. L. REv. 1 (1978), where the author suggests that the test for implica-
tion of a private action is merely a "self confirming vindication of the Burger
Court's distaste for implied actions." Id. at 21. The Burger Court failed to find
an implied private right of action in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
274National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 457-58 (1974).
275 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
278 Pillai, supra note 273, at 24.
177 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
27828 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
279 350 F. Supp. 612, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See also Fitzgerald v. Pan
American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956); Reitmeister v.
Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
1 See Judicial Solution, supra note 6, at 250.
281 Another point of view, however, is that existing state remedies were con-
sidered adequate by Congress, and that there was no intent to provide an inde-
pendent federal remedy. Aviation Tort Litigation, supra note 6, at 1101, 1105-06.
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remedy in question was not considered by Congress, it may still
advance the goals of the statutory scheme. The Federal Aviation
Act centralizes administrative regulation of aviation activity in
federal agencies, and, thereby, furthers at least two congressional
interests articulated in the Act-safety.8' and sound economic con-
ditions."' The Act, therefore, establishes uniform regulation of
aviation activities, preventing dispersal of regulation with its re-
sulting conflicts and confusion.'" Arguably, the existence of uni-
form federal regulation enables carriers to easily identify the re-
sponsibilities required of them by the Act."' Likewise, the existence
of federal rights, enforceable in federal courts, arguably advances
congressional interests in the economic stability of the air transport
industry, by providing a convenient forum for litigation of the
multiple claims which arise out of one incident. One example is
the savings of litigation expenses, realized through the consolida-
tion of actions. ' "
Federal courts have in the past implied a private right of action
under the Federal Aviation Act when they believed that the recogni-
tion of such a cause of action would further the underlying pur-
poses of the statute. For example, in Fitzgerald v. Pan American
"'E.g., 49 U.S.C. S§ 1421(a), 1422(a)(b), 1423, 1429 (1976).
2"49 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1976).
'"Another argument, however, is that the state remedies provide a deterrent
to potential violations, which is as effective as a federal remedy would be.
"Certainly pilots do not exercise more or less care depending upon whether the
state over which they are flying limits wrongful death recovery, or does not pro-
vide for contribution and indemnity." Aviation Tort Litigation, supra note 6,
at 1099.
"'1H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, 7 (1958). In Bratton v.
Shiffren, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3685 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1979) (No. 78-1398) a private right of action was found in
favor of travelers and retail travel agencies who sought to recover tour deposits
on a charter package, partly because the funds were deposited in a bank whose
duty was governed by federal law. After noting that state courts attempting to
define the duties arising in that case would necessarily have to refer to the
federal regulations governing the agreements between the principals, the court
stated that it would be "highly undesirable and inappropriate for the federal
court to permit inconsistent interpretations of the provisions by relegating
plaintiffs to the courts of the various states, the rules of which, perhaps, could
even be applied to defeat congressional goals." The court then stated its belief
that uniformity was required in the interpretation of the federal regulatory
scheme, which was quite complex, and, therefore, that this interpretation should
be undertaken by federal courts. 585 F.2d at 232.
280 Consolidation may be accomplished through 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976). See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
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World Airways,"' the court held that the implication of a remedy
in suits involving air carrier discrimination furthers the policy be-
hind the statutory proscription of discriminatory practices. " Be-
cause of racial prejudice, the plaintiffs in that case were not per-
mitted to reboard an airplane at the end of a temporary stop in
Hawaii on a flight from California to Australia. The court found
that the part of the Act prohibiting discrimination" was "for the
benefit of persons, including passengers, using the facilities of air
carriers"' and that "[a]lthough the Act does not expressly create
any civil liability, we can see no reason why the situation is not
within the doctrine which, in the absence of contrary implications,
construes a criminal statute, enacted for the protection of a speci-
fied class, as creating a civil right in members of the class, although
the only express sanctions are criminal....'
Furthermore, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., the
Supreme Court found a clear public policy in state and federal
provisions for wrongful death and provided such a remedy in a
maritime case, although the applicable maritime statute did not
provide for recovery for wrongful death. Moragne, even though a
pre-Cort case, suggests the existence of a federal policy to provide
for wrongful death, regardless of whether it is specifically articu-
lated in a federal statute. This same policy suggests that a federal
wrongful-death cause of action could be implied from provisions of
the Federal Aviation Act in air disaster cases.'
The final part of the Cort test asks whether "the cause of action
is one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law."" Moragne, which was
-7 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
2 88 Id.
2 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 404(b), 52 Stat. 993 (1938)
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1976)).
"0 229 F.2d at 501.
291 Id.
- 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
"'See Craig & Alexander, supra note 116, at 44-45. The authors, however,
rely on federal preemption to enable a federal common law provision to super-
sede the state remedy. Hence, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), in asking
whether the cause of action is one traditionally available under state law, may
tend to confine Moragne to the specific facts therein.
2"Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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decided before Cort, permitted a wrongful-death claim under fed-
eral maritime law, because recognition of such a claim furthered a
"general rule of American law"" favoring recovery for wrongful
death. The Court reached this decision despite the fact that federal
maritime law did not expressly permit a claim for wrongful death
and that wrongful-death claims were traditionally relegated to state
law."' Therefore, it is possible, in spite of the fact that wrongful
death is a cause of action "traditionally relegated to state law,.2 .
that wrongful death in maritime cases fits into a category of federal
interests for which it is not inappropriate to infer a federal cause
of action. Yet Cort does not identify, or even speak to such a pos-
sibility. If Moragne stands for the proposition that federal interest
in maritime regulation is so predominant that a federal maritime
wrongful-death claim must be recognized, regardless of the Cort
tests, the federal interest in aviation suggests similar deference.
The pervasive federal interest in aviation was recognized in Kohr
v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., which involved a collision between a
passenger airliner and a smaller aircraft. The Seventh Circuit, con-
fronted with an extremely difficult conflict of laws question, chose
to apply a federal rule of contribution and indemnity, rather than
the rules of the individual states."' The main justification offered
for this result was that the federal interest in aviation is so pervasive
that "there is no perceptible reason why federal law should not
be applied to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties
involved."' The state's rights, in comparison with the "dominant
federal interest," were slight. Therefore, the federal rule was
applied./'
A more recent case, however, may have severely limited the
viability of this approach. In Miree v. DeKalb County' the plain-
tiffs sued in a diversity action to recover as third party beneficiaries
of a contract between the county, which maintained the airport at
2 398 U.S. at 393.
296 Id.
mCort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
' 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
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which an air crash occurred, and the FAA. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, rejected an argument
that federal common law' should be applied to determine whether
the plaintiffs had standing to sue, stating that the substantial in-
terest of the United States in regulating aircraft travel and pro-
moting air travel safety was insufficient to bring federal common
law into play under the facts of that case.' The Court then de-
clined to consider an argument that the Airport and Airway De-
velopment Act' provided an implied right of action to recover
for death or injury due to violations of this statute, noting that
the petitioners had failed to plead, argue, or brief the point in the
lower courts."' Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist hinted that this
argument would not have been favored, stating "[t]he fact that
this asserted basis of liability is so obviously an afterthought may
be some indication of its merit, . ,,"08
Chief Justice Burger, however, in his concurring opinion, re-
fused to close the door completely on an implied right of action:
"I am not prepared to foreclose, at this point, the possibility that
there may be situations where the rights and obligations of private
parties are so dependent on a specific exercise of congressional
regulatory power that 'the Constitution or Acts of Congress 'require'
otherwise than that state law govern of its own force.' ""' He added
that there would be times, although infrequent, when federal courts
would be required to recognize "federal judicial competence to
declare the governing law in an area comprising issues substantially
related to an established program of government operation."'  He
concluded, however, by noting that, although the issue was close,
the cause of action asserted by the plaintiffs was not sufficiently
related to the purpose of the federal Airport and Airway Develop-
inent Act."'
03 See note 312 inf ra.
304 433 U.S. at 32-33.
30 Id.
3" Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84
Stat. 219 (1970) (codified in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1743 (1976)).
3OT433 U.S. at 33-34.
308 Id.
m Id. at 34.
310 Id. at 35, quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
580, 593 (1973).
311 Id.
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Essentially, the matter at issue is the federal court's competence
to fashion rules of law in the face of applicable state law. Where
there is an overriding federal interest3 2 sufficiently related to the
plaintiff's cause of action, a state's interest is minimal and a federal
rule should apply.3 Therefore, while the cause of action for wrong-
ful death may be one "traditionally relegated to state law," there
are cases in which the overriding federal interest in aviation com-
pels the formulation of a federal remedy. In those situations it is
not "inappropriate" to infer a cause of action based solely on fed-
eral law. While the Court in Miree'" may have raised the standards
to justify such a finding, its reluctance to base its holding on the
question of an implied right of action indicates that it is not pre-
pared to prohibit categorically a right of action inferred from the
federal government's pervasive regulation of aviation activities. 15
The existence of an implied private right of action for wrongful
death in the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act 1 would enable
"'See Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir. 1968). In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) an
endorsement on a check drawn on the United States Treasury was forged. Clear-
field Trust Company, who accepted the check as an agent for the purpose of
collection, stamped the check "Prior Endorsement Guaranteed." In the re-
sulting litigation the question arose on the matter of which law to apply. The
Court was quick to state that the rights and duties connected with commercial
paper issued by the United States were not subject to local law. Hence, Erie
did not apply. In the interest of uniformity federal law must be applied. In the
absence of an appropriate act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion
the rule of law according to their own standards. This is what is known as the
federal common law.
"I Cf. Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969)
(in the absence of any compelling national interest or need for national uni-
formity a court should not imply a private cause of action); Yelinek v. Worley,
284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968) (implying a civil remedy for damages would
be foreign to the purpose of the Federal Aviation Act).
"'
4In Miree the Court found that there was no overriding national interest
in the contractual right of the plaintiffs. The landmark case which draws this
distinction is Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956), where the cause
of action involved United States bonds. The parties were private parties, and the
issue was whether the respondent had taken the bonds in good faith, without
knowledge or notice of defect in title. The Court held that, while the nature of
the rights and obligations created by commercial paper of the United States
government is controlled by federal law, the question of the case, proof of good
faith, involved a private, essentially local transaction governed by local law.
,15 There are, however, strong indications that future courts will be restrictive
in their approval of implied rights of action in air activities. See Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See note 273 supra.
3149 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976).
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litigants to employ the federal question jurisdictional basis in air dis-
aster cases '" and to escape the effects of an anti-diversity bill. This
access to federal courts ultimately would result in savings and con-
venience for the litigants. It also would engender efficient use of
judicial resources through the availability of devices which enable
consolidation of multiple causes of action.
CONCLUSION
Although the abolition of diversity jurisdiction would reduce
the congestion in federal courts, it would also eliminate the tradi-
tional means of bringing air disaster cases under federal jurisdiction.
Abolition of diversity jurisdiction would deprive litigants of the
procedural advantages of the federal courts that are particularly
useful in large-scale air disaster litigation. The preservation of
diversity jurisdiction, however, would perpetuate the numerous
problems caused by the lack of uniformity in states' laws. One
solution to all these problems is the creation of a federal statutory
scheme to govern the litigation of air disaster cases. If Congress
approves an anti-diversity bill and fails to provide a federal cause
of action for air disaster cases, it is possible that air disaster liti-
gants may be able to obtain access to federal courts by joining
the United States as a defendant or arguing for an implied right
of action under the Federal Aviation Act. Nevertheless, there is
no guarantee that these alternative jurisdictional devices will be
available in every air disaster case. In the absence of diversity
jurisdiction or an express statutory federal jurisdictional grant for
air disaster cases, future aviation disasters of the magnitude of the
O'Hare incident will have additional disruptive effects on our court
systemY318
317 See Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1956); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
318The optimal solution, then, is as advocated by Judge Henry J. Friendly:
[A] federal act as to deaths of passengers caused by interstate
carriers, thereby rescuing the courts from problems as to limita-
tions on recovery under some states' death acts that have recently
plagued them and are far from solved, and avoiding the seeming
injustice that the estate of one passenger may recover without limit
whereas that of the man sitting next to him could only get a small
sUm.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 418 (1964).
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